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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaint if.f-Respondent,

-v-

.•
.•
.•

Case No. 18083

..

ZOLLA HALES,
Defendant-Appellant.

.•

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING

To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of Utah:
Comes now the Respondent, within twenty days of the
filing of the Petition for Rehearing in the above-titled case;
and respectfully submits this Brief in Answer to Petition for
Rehearing, pursuant to and in accordance with Rule 76{e) {2),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for cause thereof show:
1.

The alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not

constitute Plain Error and therefore may not be the subject of
review by the appellate court.
2.

The appellant could have objected to the alleged

misconduct to correct any error and to preserve the issue for
appeal.
3.

The evidence at trial sufficiently supports the

verdict.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4.

Appellant had adequate opportunity to respond to

newly uncovered cases and authority presented at oral
argument.
Wherefore, appellant's Petition for Rehearing should
be denied.
~RGUMENT

POINT I
THE ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUC'T DID
NOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR AND THEREFORE
MAY NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF REVIEW BY THE
APPELLATE COURT.
Plain error is reversible whether the error is
reserved by objection at trial court or not.
States, 226 F.2d 561, 569 (9th Cir. 1955).

Herzog v. United
Plain error is

defined in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 52(b), 18
u.s.C.A., as an "error or defect affecting substantial
rights."
Rule 52 does four things:
(1) defines
"Harmess Error", (2) provides that
"Harmless Error" shall be disregarded by
the courts, (3) defines "Plain Error", and
{4) provides that "Plain Error" may be
noticed although not brought to the
attention of the court.
The definitions
make it clear that all error is either
"Harmless" or "Plainn--depending upon
whether it affects substantial rights.
It
cannot be disputed that "Plain" error and
prejudicial error mean the same thing, as
prejudicial error is error which affects
substantial rights.
There is no
-2-
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mysterious third type of error which
appellate courts may recognize under
certain circumstances.
If error is
harmless it will not be considered whether
called to the attention of the court or
not; if it is plain or prejudicial error
it must be considered if properly brought
to the attention of the court and may be
considered although not brought to the
attention of the court.
Herzog at 569 {citations omitted).
Utah statutes are clear on the appellate disposition
of error.

"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which

does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded."

Utah Code Ann.,

§

77-35-30{a).

In this case there was no error affecting the
substantial rights of the appellant.

The alleged

impermissible comments were not perceived as an abrogation of
the defendant's rights at the time they were uttered since the
defendant did not object to them.

The context clearly

indicates that the statements were made to refute defendant's
argument as to who had proved what, not to bring the failure
of the defendant to testify to the jury's attention {T.
127-129, 131-132, 142-143}.

Following the trial the defendant

moved for a new trial and the trial court carefully considered
the comments and ruled "I have doubts that [the statements
were] improper, but, in any event I don't think [thev were]
2rejudicial."

Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial

at 98 (emphasis added).

Utah courts enjoy a presumption of
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veracity and correctness which may be disturbed only when an
appellant shows such serious inequity as to manifest clear
abuse of discretion.

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.

Wright, Utah, 521 P.2d 563 {1973); Latimer v. Katz, Utah, 508
P.2d 543 {1974}.

The appellant fails to indicate wherein the

trial court abused its discretion in ruling the comments not
prejudicial and no such abuse is manifest in the record.
Therefore the ruling stands and the comments are not
prejudicial, or do not constitute plain error.
Bennion, 30 Utah 2d 312, 517 P.2d 1008 {1973}

Amoss v.
{see, generally,

Respondent's Brief, Point I, p. 5).
The appellant relies on several federal and state
cases in an attempt to show that there was plain error in this
case.

Each of the following cases is cited by the appellant:

In United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294 {8th Cir.} cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 958 {1978}, the prosecutor "obviously
misstated the evidence" {Id. at 1301) in closing argument.
The court opined:
Although we feel that it would have been
better if the government had not made the
questioned remark, we note that the trial
court has broad discretion in controlling
closing arguments.
Absent a showing of
abuse of discretion this court will not
reverse.
"The dominating question,
always, is whether the argument complained
of was so offensive as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial." We must view
the prosecutor's remarks in the context of
-4-
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the entire trial.
With this in mind we
find that the remarks of the prosecutor do
not require reversal.
United States v. Bohr at 1301 (citations omitted).
In United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th
Cir. 1978), the prosecutor made reference to the oefendant's
failure to respond, or to respond truthfully, to an FBI
investigator's inquiries where the defendant did not testify
at trial.
In several cases this court has noted as
plain or fundamental error questions to a
witness, including the defendant himself,
which reveal that defendant refused
comment when questioned by police or FBI
agents, when the prosecution made comments
which stated or inferred that there was
something wrong with defendant's failure
to deny or explain.
The instant situation
falls easily within that line of cases.
United States v. Gilliland at 1390.

The appellant cites a

quotation in the Petition for Rehearing at pages 1 and 2
attributed to the Gilliland case which does not appear in the
text of the opinion.
In United States v. Segal, 649 F.2d 599 (8th Cir.
1981), the prosecution allegedly vouched for the credibility
of government witnesses and expressed his personal opinion on
the merits of the case.

The court found no error and affirmed

the conviction, citing United States v. Bohr.

The appellant

quotes footnote 10 on page 604 of Segal which includes a
-5-
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citation to United States v. Splain, 545 F.2d 1131 {8th Cir.
1976).

The Splain court said:
Splain's counsel nid not proffer an
objection to this particular comment.
Therefore, this court will review the
alleged ~rror only if it is shown that the
argument was so prejudicial as to have
"affected the substantial rights resulting
in a miscarriage of justice." As
indicated above, the overwhelming evidence
of guilt in this case belies any
contention that Splain's substantial
rights were adversely affected by the
prosecutor's comments.

Splain at 1136.
In United States v. Harbin, 601 F.2d 773 {5th Cir.
1979), the prosecutor attempted to provide the full evidence
for the jury.
Appellants' attack on statements made
by government counsel as comments on their
failure to testify in violation of their
fifth amendment rights, requires more
discussion.
The United States entered
extensive wiretappen conversations as
evidence at trial, which necessitated
calling witnesses to identify the various
voices heard on the recordings as those of
particular defendants. During his closing
argument the United States Attorney stated
to the jury:
Now, you personally, of course, don't
have knowledge of the voices of various
people in the case, but the people who
testified said that they knew these
people.
They explained to you how they
knew them and the circumstances of their
voice identification.
-6-
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He also declared, in another comment on
prosecution witnesses:
And it was clear--it was clear as it
could be that these people were telling
the truth ann that they were not holding
back anything or getting anybody.
Did you
hear the. defense attorney spring out
anything, weren't you trying to get this
guy because you hate him? No, there is no
undercurrent to that in this trial at all.
These people were merely getting up here,
if you want to use the term, "spilling the
whole beans" on everybody.
Just laid it
right out •
.1\ppellants characterize these two
statements as improper comments on their
failure to take the stand by reasoning
that the jurors could only have personal
knowledge of their voices by having heard
them testify, and the government
witnesses' testimony could only have been
contradicted by that of defendants so that
the comments served to point out their
failure to take the stand. While oblique
comments on a defendant's failure to
testify, if sufficiently suggestive, can
be as pernicious and as unlawful as direct
comments, we find no such reversible error
here.
The test to be applied when it is
claimed that a prosecutor has
impermissibly commented on a defendant's
fifth amendment protected silence is
whether or not "it can be said that the
prosecutor's manifest intention was to
comment upon the accused's failure to
testify [or] was • • • of such a character
that the jury would naturally and
necessarily take it to be a comment on the
failure of the accused to testify. We
conclude that appellants have failed to
satisfy either of these criteria.
Harbin at 776 (citations omitted); See also:

State v.

Jefferson, 353 A.2d 190, 198 (R.I. 1976).
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Although the cases United States v. Graham, 325 F.2d
922 (6th Cir. 1963) and Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236
(1943) support the proposition that plain error is reversible
error, they do not address the issue of prosecutorial comments
on defendant's failure to testify.

In People v. Cruz, 605

P.2d 830, 162 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980), the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct was held not to have been such as to cause a
harmful result that could not have been cured by timely
admonition (Cruz at 842).

If the defendant had objected to

the various remarks complained of, the alleged defect could
have been cured.
In State v. Smith, 420 P.2d 278 (Ariz. 1966), the
prosecution made statements which provide a good example of
the kind of comments amounting to plain error:
Counsel talked about the defendant not
takinq the stand.
He gave several reasons
for which the defendant did not have to
take the stand.
Since he has opened the
door in that area, I would like to say
that one of the reasons the defendant does
not have to take the stand is because when
he does take the stand, he is submitted to
cross-examination, and on cross
examination the state would be allowed to
go into any aspect of the defendant's life
which might have a bearing on the case and
he would be asked about anything that he
may have done in the past, any trouble he
had been in, any conviction that he may
have had, and certainly if he had been in
trouble before, he wouldn't want to take
the stand.

-8-
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Smith at 279.

These comments clearly andress the nefendant's

failure to testify ano therefore breach the defendant's fifth
amerrlment privilege against self-incrimination.

The Smith

comments are much different from those of this case.
It is clear that plain error is reversible error
despite a defendant's failure to object.

However, none of the

authority appellant cites in her Petition for Rehearing tends
to show that the prosecutor's comments in this case were
prejudicial.

These cases show that the comments were

permissible under the circumstances at the trial (see,
generally, Respondent's Brief, Point I, p. 5).

POINT II
THE APPELLANT COULD HAVE OBJECTED TO THE
ALLEGED MISCONDUCT' TO CORRECT ANY ERROR
AND PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
The appellant contends that an objection out of the
hearing of the jury prior to deliberation would have
compounded the error because it would have "cause[d] the jury
to pause ana reflect at that point on the damaging comments."
Petition for Rehearing, p. 6.

The appellant fails to note the

admonition of Justice Oaks in State v. Hales (Utah, No. 18083,
filed July, 1982, Oaks, J.).

The objection should have been

made at the close of the state's argument out of the hearing
of the jury prior to the deliberations (State v. Hales at 4),
not, as the appellant perceives, as an interruption of the
state's argument in close proximity to the alleged erroneous
comments.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

The appellant further argues that to object would
have been fruitless since the trial court ruled subsequently
that the comments were not prejudicial.

On the contrary,

objection at trial would have reserved the issue for review,
the precise end the appellant seeks.

The comments were so

innocuous that defendant's counsel apparently did not perceive
that the comments might be prejudicial until they were taken
out of context.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORTS THE VERDICT.
The appellant maintains that the testimony of two
fire inspectors was inconclusive; therefore the guilt of the
appellant was in doubt.

However, the appellant fails to weigh

the remainder of the evidence introduced at trial.
Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the
verdict in this case did not hinge on the
prosecution's comments; there was
substantial evidence presented sufficient
to sustain the conviction without the
prosecutor's comments.
The lack of
evidence of fire in the home shortly after
the burning was to have taken place, the
great evidence of burning outside the
home, the inadequate damage to the metal
chair, lack of burns or singes on
defendant's person, the high improbability
of a spark igniting the records as the
defense postulates, the theory of
embezzlement providing a motive for the
destruction, and the unreliability of the
appellant's husband's testimony could have
sustained the verdict without any argument
by the prosecutor whatsoever.
Respondent's Brief, p. 12.
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The jury was convinced beyond a reasonable oouht
that Zolla Hales willfully destroyed puhlic records in her
custody.

POINT IV
APPELLANT HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO
RESPOND TO NEWLY UNCOVERED AUTHORITY
PRESENTED AT ORAL ARGUMENT.
The appellant contends that she was not afforded
adequate opportunity to respond to newly uncovered cases and
authority presented at oral argument.

Appellant's counsel was

notified several days prior to the oral argument of the new
cases not included in Respondent's Brief.

Appellant made no

objection at oral argument to the use of the cases and even
attempted to analyze one of the cases in her favor.
has, even now,

Appellant

failed to adequately rebut the provisions of

the new authority.

CONCLUSION
The alleged error complained of was not reserved for
appellate review and was ruleo not prejudicial by the trial
judge.

It therefore not plain error.

The appellant's failure

to object at the trial should preclude her from raising the
issue on appeal or on rehearing.

The Petition for Rehearing

should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of August,

1982.

EARL F.
Assistant Attorney General
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